Priri

Melissa Deckman, Ph.D.

Since gen z -Americans grow to a larger part of the ballot for election voices, a partisan and ideological gap in young men and women is expanded. This Spotlight analysis examines partiality and ideology in the past decade among young Americans taking into account changes by gender and breed. While there have been some changes in partiality among young Americans over time, their political ideology has remained quite consistent in the past ten years with important restrictions on racial groups.

Party affiliation

The percentage of Americans, who identify as Republicans, rose from 22% in 2013 to 29% in 2024, while the proportion of Democrats rose from 32% in 2013 to 35% in 2020 before falling to 30% in 2024. The percentage has been since 2013. 9% in 2013 to 15% in 2024.

There is a clear connection between old and partiality. In 2024, the Americans were 50 to 64 (35%) and 65 and older (35%) more identified as Republicans than younger Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 (21%) and aged 30 to 49 (25%). Three out of ten Americans (30%) of all ages, which were identified as democratic and around a quarter (26%) as independent. At the same time, younger Americans aged 18 to 29 to 29 and 30-49 categorized themselves as “others” with a total of higher rates than older Americans and Americans.

Compared to older Americans, the party gender gap between young Americans is most pronounced. In 2024, 26% of the young men identified as Republicans identified compared to 17% of the young women-a 9 percent spread. In contrast, the gap in relation to the identification of the Republicans was significantly lower among other age cohorts. The gender -specific gap in republican identity among younger Americans has increased significantly since 2013 when 18% of young men and 14% of young women identified as Republicans.

The binding of the young men has grown to GOP since 2013, but most of this growth has occurred in young white men, whose belonging to the GOP has increased from 26% today to 36% in 2013. Remarkably, we have seen an increase in republican identity of 8 percent in young white men by 8 percent since 2021. In contrast, the profits of the Republican identification among young color men were more steamed, although young Hispanic men have had an increase in Republicans by 6 percentage points since 2021. Compared to 2013, however, the identification of the Republican Party of the Young Black Men changed relatively little, with a short increase in 2019.

Young women identified themselves less than Republican and identify more as democratic than their male colleagues in racist groups. In 2024, about one of four young white women with the Democratic Party (26%) in the mood compared to 18% of young white men. The gender -specific gap in republican identity in young Hispanic women is around 2 to 5 percentage points over time, but the GOP identity was very low in young Hispanic Americans regardless of gender. In 2024, the pluralities of young black men (38%) and women (37%) identified as democratic.

Remarkably, young black women in relation to belonging to the Democratic Party recorded the most important decline and fell from 62% in 2013 to 37% in 2024. Young black women are not moved towards the GOP. However, we find that only 2% of young black women who identified themselves as Republicans in 2024 – a percentage that has remained largely static since 2013. Instead, the young black women are increasingly identifying themselves as independent, choose “others” as partisan category or remain their partisan identity identity identity identity ID card.

Political ideology

In 2024, more than a third of the Americans were identified as a moderate (35%) or conservative (35%), while 27%were identified as liberal. While the proportion of conservative and liberals within the American public has remained consistent since 2013, the proportion of moderates from 28% in 2013 rose to 35% in 2024, and the proportion of those who selected “others” to describe their political ideology steadily in 2013 in 2024.

Four out of ten older Americans identified as conservative, including 40% of age groups aged 50 to 64 and 42% of the 65 and older, compared to 25% of the younger Americans aged 18 to 29 years and 30% of 30 to 49 years. In contrast, younger Americans are more common than older Americans than liberal. Around three out of ten young Americans aged 18 to 29 (33%) and those aged 30 to 49 (29%) identified as liberal compared to 22% of age groups aged 50 to 64 and 26% of 65 and older.

There has been a gender-specific ideology among the Americans for a long time, and our data show that women for most age groups report that women are less conservative than men with the exception of Americans aged 30 to 49, whose ideological make-up is largely similar. In 2024, men between the ages of 18 and 29 were more conservative than women between the ages of 18 and 29 as conservative (29% compared to 22%) and less likely than liberal (28% compared to 37%).

In 2024, young white men (38%) were more conservative than Hispanic men (20%) and black men (16%). However, there is no indication that young men have become more conservative over the past ten years: 31% of young men who were identified as conservative in 2013 compared to 29% in 2024. Since 2019, there has been a certain growth of conservative identity to 38%, while young Hispanic and Black men have reduced far less conservatively in recent decades.

Compared to young men, young women identified more less often than conservative and identify more often than liberal. The ideological self -identification has remained largely similar in young white women in the past ten years, while Hispanic young women became significantly less conservative in 2013 in 2024. The conservative identification of young black women in young black women has fallen from 25% in 2013 in the past decades. And slightly to 43% in 2024.

While young men have long been identifying more than young women as Republicans – and have become more in recent years – they are still doing this with lower rates than American men as a whole, also because relatively few young men with color identify themselves as a republican and generation Z, which has a much more racist and ethnically diverse generation than older generations. At the same time, however, there is no indication that young men have been more conservative in the past ten years, although young white men are increasingly identifying themselves than conservative than their Hispanic or black colleagues.

In contrast, young women remain less likely than young men than republican or as conservative, but they also show some partisan and ideological changes in the past decade. Compared to 2013, the democratic partisanity of young white women has remained quite stable, although the Republican identity has increased slightly. Republican identity among young Latinas and young black women has remained very low in the past ten years. Young black women in particular, who have identified strongly with the Democratic Party in the past, are increasingly deciding to describe the option “others” or “do not know” themselves as independent or increasingly.