The Moscow visit of Xi Jinping emphasizes China's strategic weaknesses

When Russian tanks will go to Red Square on May 9 on May 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping will stand next to the Russian President Vladimir Putin – a terrifying image for a country that claims to be a force for global stability. The image of XI in Moscow underlines the growing tension in the heart of China's foreign policy: its strategic partnership with Russia is increasingly colliding with its broader ambitions, which can be seen as responsible global leaders, as a stable alternative to an alternative presented as American volatility and the western decline.

Although the relationship between China and Russia remains determined, XI faces challenges. Last year Moscow expanded his diplomatic public relations work, negotiated with Washington and signed a mutual defense pact with Pyongyang. Xi's visit offers him the opportunity to affirm the strength of the Beijing Moskau partnership to affect-Selbst when Putin's diplomatic options grow.

Trump's disorder, China missed opportunity

Some observers argue that China could make us diplomatic disorder in a strategic advantage under the second Trump government. Beijing has long believed that China offers the opportunity to expand its influence. The Chinese leaders have actively courted Europe, Asia and the global south and positioned Beijing as a more reliable economic and diplomatic partner – especially as Trump's irregular tariffs, open considerations about annexing foreign areas, US foreign assistance and disregarding allies and international norms have alienated a large part of the world.

China was not subtle. Last month, when the US China trade war escalated, XI toured Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia, signed more than 100 deals about the cooperation of the supply chain, artificial intelligence, health and green energy. China has also reinforced his advertising in Europe and Asia, visa exceptions and accelerations from discussions on economic cooperation. Xi welcomed the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in Beijing in April and the case that China and Europe should defend globalization together and oppose “one -sided actions of bullying” – a clear blow in the United States. Just a few weeks earlier, the top diplomats of China, Japan and South Korea met with trilateral conversations, in which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged deeper trade and investment relationships and a revival of negotiations on a long-standing trilateral free trade agreement.

But Xi's appearance in Moscow throws China's campaign – and reveals the limits of his strategy. Beijing is visible with Putin, while Russia is worth an aggression war against Ukraine, and increases the suspicion that it is willing to stand by revisionist powers about the defense of international norms. Of course, the diplomatic costs of this orientation are uneven. Many governments in Beijing's global partnership with Moscow as unproblematic or at least secondary to their broader interests with China. But in Europe and parts of Asia, where the skepticism of Beijing is already running high, it is unlikely that XIS overtures offer calm.

Strategic necessity and growing friction

Why does XI take the risk? The answer lies in the strategic necessity. Since the competition is intensified with the United States, Beijing Moscow sees as an essential, albeit risky partner.

Chinese officials reject the view of an “reverse Nixon” – the scenario in which Washington and Moscow bring relationships into harmony and let China areolated. The consensus view in Beijing is that Putin Trump probably does not give the Ukraine peace agreement that he wants. The distrust between Moscow and Washington remains too profound for the complete reset.

What is nervous about the Chinese officers is not a potential approach to Trump-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin-Tutin, but the tightening of the ties between Putin and Kim Jong-Un. The recently signed Russia-North Korea defense pact has only deepened these fears. Chinese analysts are increasingly uneasy about the expanding and opaque military relationships in Russia to Pyongyang and their potential to create instability right on the doorstep.

Beijing is particularly cautious that Putin could position itself as a broker between Trump and Kim, marginalized China and distracts the US attention from the storming negotiations on Ukraine. For Beijing, which has long been used to playing a central role in the diplomacy of the Korean Peninsula, the position of his position in Moscow would be viewed as a serious blow.

Nevertheless, XI is not inclined to make Putin new concessions. Russia's economy has stalled, his military is overstretched and its diplomatic leverage with the West remains limited. China continues to dominate the economic relationship, and this imbalance will probably not change soon – although it is increasingly a source for the resentment of the Kremlin.

A diplomatic balancing of offspring for China

For China, Russia is both a strategic capital and potential liability – an ally in combating western dominance, but also a source of risk. A weakened Russia cannot fully serve Beijing's strategic goals. However, one day a resident, independent Russia could reappear as a rival. It was not long ago that China and the Soviet Union were bitter opponents who had come across a highly militarized 4,000 kilometer border.

Beijing's ideal result is a Russia that is strong enough to return to the West, but weak enough to remain safe in China's orbit. However, the management of this sensitive balance becomes more difficult – and has global consequences.

Xi's visit to Moscow reveals the contradictions in the heart of China's foreign policy. The conviction that Beijing could use from American dysfunction and at the same time could maintain credibility with Europe and Asia proves to be naive. Xi's hug of autocrats abroad does not strengthen the global hand of China – it narrows.