Diplomatic asylum as safe ports? – Analysis of the exception of the political crime in Mexico against Ecuador

Authors: Natasha Mittal and Raima Singh*

The violation of the inviolability by the Ecuadorian armed forces on April 5, 2024, when he violently entered the Mexican message, was widely criticized as a gross violation of the international principles that were embedded in the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”). Ecuadorian armed forces penetrated into the Mexican message or Mr. Jorge Glas, former Vice President of Ecuador. And embezzlement of public funds for glass in the opposition of the “political crimes” so that the receiving state justifies Mr. Glas's diplomatic asylum according to Article IV of the convent on diplomatic asylum (“Caracas Convention”).

This article examines whether corruption can be classified as a political crime for the purpose of diplomatic asylum, which emphasizes the legal vacuum in the definition of political crimes over the jurisdiction and the resulting conflict with the sovereignty of a guest state. Against this background, it suggests solutions after normative flexibility to enable a case -specific decision.

Legal suspension: Discretion of the receiving state in the definition of political crimes

The diplomatic asylum, as defined in Article 1 of the Caracas Convention, grants the protection of a state within its messages or other diplomatic premises for people who flee from political persecution. In his judgment, the ICJ found that the preliminary measures ratified by Ecuador ”Expose to the invulnerability, insofar as Article 45 (a) of the Vienna Convention required. “The provisional measures prescribed by the ICJ should protect the respective rights of both parties after the final decision of the court in accordance with Article 41.1 of the Law of the ICJ.

The one -sided competence, which is granted to the receiving state in accordance with Article IV of Caraca's Convention, with which he determines whether the asylum seeker is a political perpetrator can be seen as a potential restriction for the sovereignty of the territorial state. In Article III of the Caracas Convention, asylum cannot be granted to people who have been sentenced to a competent court or already convicted either for criminal charges. The legislative intention behind Article IV of the Caracas Convention from 1954 on diplomatic asylum was to set up protection against politically motivated law enforcement measures by allowing the asylum-strangling state and not to the territorial state to determine whether a crime is qualified as “politically” and thus guarantees protection. This provision should prevent the hosts from being prevented from being prevented from describing dissidents or political opponents as “common criminals” in order to justify their persecution. By proving this authority in the diplomatic mission, they tried to maintain humanitarian principles and ensure that people who are faced with real political oppression could look for refuge.

According to the Ecuadorian Comprehensive Organic Penal Code, corruption does not fall under the express category of political crime, which excludes it from asylum protection. This is a suspected legal floating in the exercise of sovereignty, since an independent “refuge” can be formed in any case. This provides the de facto Asylum seekers with a window to escape and avoid the assessment of the state, in the territory of which the crime was committed. Therefore, Article IV has not reached its intended balance in practice, especially because of its unrestricted unilateralism and the lack of objective criteria. This is because such a one -sided provision by the receiving state may prevent the judicial and administrative authority of the territorial state and denies it the ability to pursue people in its responsibility. This risks of interpretation, which portrays diplomatic asylum ineffective, must be weighed with the established ICJ precedent in Columbia against Peru (“Columbia Asylum”), whereby the court found that asylum cannot override or replace the appropriate legal proceedings.

It is emphasized that the right to seek asylum in another countryThe right cannot be called … if the law contradicts the purposes and principles of the United Nations. “” “The principles of good government, anti-corruption and the rule of law, which are reinforced by Uncac, fall within the wider framework of these UN goals. Binding contract that is ratified by both Ecuador and Mexico. Refuge that increases the principle that asylum cannot serve as a sign against accountability.

Recommendations and far forward

A) Derived
The teaching of appreciation (“MOA”) Accounts for Judicial Deference While Acknowledging the Diversity of Laws Across Nations. Incorporating the Principle of Normative Flexibility, The Doctrine Specifies A 'Zone of Legality,' Within What Make Independent Decisions. A Mere Overview Of The Afermath of Violations of Inviolability Determines that the VcDR Largely Remains Impervious to the facts and Circumstances of Each Case.DCPA”). The DCPA provides the state secretary the due powers to withdraw the diplomatic status of a country. Such a provision contradicts the absolute immunity, which in accordance with VCD. Article 1 (5) of the DCPA clearly provides:“ ““When finding whether this does this, he must take into account the security of the public; (b) national security; and (c) city and land planning. “ The legislative intention of DCPA enables the decision -makers to rethink whether the violation of the principle of inviolability was essential in accordance with the facts of the case. The inclusion of such a provision can bring a certain clarity, since the scope of the exceptions can be clearly defined. This promotes the recording of the realities of every violation and grants the national courts the discretion of keeping these crimes in their belonging.

B) revision

It is obvious that the review standard is unclear due to the lack of an objective criterion and the self-assessment clause of Article IV of Caracas Convention. In the General Assembly Resolution 3321, the Member States did not agree to support diplomatic asylum rights only on the basis of humanitarian aspects. Although diplomatic asylum and political refuge share a common humanitarian basis, the necessary criteria for granting such as asylum or refuge differ significantly. Therefore, the justification of “humanitarian considerations” Mexico could be wrong.
In addition, Article 2 of the Havana convent says that “Asylum must not be granted, except for the period for the person who was looking for asylum to ensure his security in other ways.” For example in the Columbia caseThe court decided that diplomatic asylum had to present “sanctuary” in urgent or unusual circumstances, is limited to the duration that is only necessary to ensure the protection of the asylum seeker. Therefore, the diplomatic asylum, which Mr. Glass is made available, cannot be extended indefinitely, but only until the urgency takes.

In view of this judgment, Mexico's confession creates a responsibility anomaly in accordance with Article IV of the Caracas Convention. This underlines the handicap of the reception state in the implementation of a preliminary examination of messages and individuals and underlines the inherent need for reasonable revisions in diplomatic law. If the Ecuadorian stance prevails, it could determine a precedent that limits the discretionary power of the asylum grilling state and effectively restricts the protective function of the diplomatic asylum. The deletion of equilibrium guarantees a review standard, which is neither completely primarily or from the habitual law of the region, but also one that also corresponds to the state of the state with the takeover of the asylum seekers.

* Raima Singh is a law student in the second year by the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. Her research interests include international law and human rights law for international law and human rights law.