Knowledge of the number of points: Why the EU's reimbursement is based on political consensus

“The times when you are a-chat” and-like decades after Bob Dylan published his folk classic in the decade “peace and love” break.

In March, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, proposed what seemed unthinkable for 70 years: a plan for the resumption of Europe. In order to approach this in a “old-fashioned manner” with every country, which, however, expands its own national armed forces inefficiently and creates double and separate skills on the entire continent. It is even more important that Europe's 20^TH-MentätstätSmefhiste warns against it. The EU member states allow, independently, without coordination or clear management to be rebuilt independently, a serious risk for the European cohesion-especially taking into account the rise of right-wing extremists, nationalist rhetoric and democratic residues on parts of the continent.

While the defense remains a national competence that is deeply associated with sovereignty, every European initiative depends on successful integration. Article 42.2 of the contract on the European Union expressly expects the “progressive framing of a common defense policy of the Union” that “it will lead to a common defense if the European Council unanimously decides”. EU contracts therefore not only allow a full-fledged European defense policy. However, such a development must be based on a coherent political discourse.

Integration, not fragmentation

The defense integration was on the table right from the start. In 1950, shortly after French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented the Schuman declaration, the Pleven plan set a vision for a common European defense. After the creation of the European coal and steel community (ECSC) in 1951, their Member States negotiated a contract to create a European defense community (EDC).

There were two reasons to create the EDC: First, to prevent the return of the war to the European continent; Second, to counteract the growing Soviet hostility. While the second reason is just as relevant as in the early years of the Cold War, the first reason rejects the claim that European integration is a pacifist project. The founding fathers in Europe were expressly that peace can only be guaranteed through joint defense, which led to its persecution of the EDC right from the start. This is also the reason why Jean Monnet, when the EDC project collapsed, expressed his complete disappointment by dismissing his role as president of the high authority of the ECSC.

Now channeled by the Leyen Monnet and other EU founding fathers through their confirmation that Europe can achieve “peace through strength”. Only by bundling military resources can EU member states build a real deterrent against external threats and, as Schuman said, make conflicts within the block “not only unthinkable, but material impossible”.

For the EU, however, this is not time to bring EDC back from the ashes. In order to avoid the repetition of past mistakes, it must instead create solidly common institutions in order to shape the “turnaround in time” and to first regain an increase in military spending with political unity.

European political unity

In addition to the attitude of the EU to a common defense policy, they also took the need to complement military cooperation with political integration. If the EDC is successful, it should have been paired with a supranational European political community (EPC) – an earlier iteration of the initiative of the same name by the French President Emmanuel Macron. The latter is hardly more than a dialogue forum, the EPC of the 1950s aimed at creating a common European attitude with regard to questions of strategic geopolitical importance. Since the war in Ukraine causes the EU to face the growing defense responsibility, it needs a similarly strong political framework to meet its military ambitions.

A re -export without proper governance risk that undermines the values ​​that it should defend: peace, democracy and the rule of law. As a result, the EU must guarantee that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands and that the Member States cannot use them against each other. There can also be no doubt that such weapons only maintain European ideals – and not to threaten or weaken them. To do this, the resumption with a political coalescence must go hand in hand.

What can the EU do?

Today's fragile and fragile security environment makes it clear that the EU's common security and defense policy – with its limited ambition and intergovernmental nature – is not suitable for the purpose. It certainly does not provide the political cement that is needed to support the establishment of the military strength of Europe.

And while the current efforts to strengthen the European defense sector are pointing in the right direction, the EU has to go further than to create the tax area for the Member States for the resumption of the Member States or the incentives for the joint procurement of military devices and the support of the European defense industry. It must develop a common framework that organizes the efforts of the Member States, ensures accountability and guarantees that defense policy serves common European goals.

The fact is that the EU urgently needs a political umbrella and a legal way to combine its Member States if they strengthen the development of their military arsenal. When the ambivalence of US President Donald Trump endangers the cohesion of the alliance to NATO, it is important that the connections between EU members come closer than before. However, this is not about replacing NATO, but about strengthening its European pillar.

Secure political bonds

Some EU member states could not be willing to participate in their defense power, especially in view of the fact that defense and security are so sensitive areas. If no consensus can be achieved for all 27 members, for example due to Hungary's different views of the war in Ukraine or how the EU should approach its business with foreign powers such as Russia, the EU can try to make progress with 26 members instead. This could also achieve this through another “coalition of the will”.

Mechanisms such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), improved cooperation or a potential additional contract could offer a stable framework for further integration. These would enable a more precise cooperation between a sub -group of EU member states that are willing to reach the extra parts and to promote a deeper unit within the block, especially in foreign and security issues.

Such strong political bonds may look like an unattainable mirage, but they are both legally feasible and necessary so that Europe is successful in today's confrontational geopolitics. It is only one question of political will: Europeans should expect their leaders to rise on this occasion because, as stipulated in the Schuman declaration, “world peace cannot be protected without creative efforts to be proportional to the threats”.

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A debate is threatened with weapons against butter. However, this is essentially incorrect and misguided – in reality, Europe should ask whether it can justify to have more weapons without closing a stronger political bond between those that lead them. This should go beyond what exists at the NATO or EU level: Such a bond not only has to blame solidarity and mutual defense, but also promote a common perspective on the use of military power in Europe. Just as “no taxation without representation” can exist, there should be “no militarization without integration”.